Introduction
The boiler design in question has a fixed grate. The primary air is supplied under the grate by natural draft created by the chimney. The secondary air is missing. The primary air quantity is regulated by a draft regulator which is actuated by the boiler supply water temperature. The fuel loading of the boiler is manual. Upon ignition all of the fuel charge (batch) is involved in the combustion process; consequently, there is no possibility of precise regulation and division of the combustion process into separate subprocesses -heating, drying, devolatilisation and burning. The same boiler is usually used for both coal and wood firing.
The boiler can be installed in the closed or open system. In the open system, an open tank at the highest point of the installation is used to store the expanded fluid. In the closed system (pressurized/sealed), a closed expansion vessel is used to store the expanded fluid.
Closed hydronic systems emerged in the 1960s. They were an improvement on open ones. The fuel switch also contributed to this transition. For example, in West Germany in the 1950s coal stoves were the main device used for heating, and in the 1960s there was a fuel switch from coal to heating oil with the development of oil fired boilers. These boilers could fully automatically deliver heating and hot water. In the 1970s gas started to gain ground, and oil use decline started after the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 .
The theory is clear on the subject of solid fuel boiler installation in closed systems. There is a clear warning in [1] :"It is forbidden to use closed expansion vessels if the boiler is fired by solid fuel, because in case of failure of a boiler component (for example safety valve) there is no possibility of momentarily stopping the heating, unlike in the case of liquid or gaseous fuel".
On the other hand, the practice is clear too: the draft regulator is an element that regulates the temperature and thus eliminates the need for the safety heat exchanger. The safety heat exchanger requires a water supply access point, which is not always available in boiler rooms. The filling of the system is done using hoses.
The theory's "argument" is that the draft regulator is indeed a proven element, with over 50 years in service; its operation is effective when it regulates slow changes in temperature and daily weather patterns, but it cannot handle abrupt changes in the heating system. These changes occur when the flow is stopped by electricity shortage, pump failure, air lock, or physical blockage in the flow system. The heat must then be removed from the system, which the draft regulator cannot perform. The result is overheating. Overheating stops when all the heat is dissipated.
The survey on the current practice, overview of the English, German and EU standards covering this topic, good practice examples, and testing methods proving when solid fuel boilers can be installed in closed systems are given in [2] .
In closed systems boiling is unacceptable. The British standard [3] recommends that an antiflash margin equivalent to 11 °C in temperature be allowed.
Closed-loop hydronic systems should be designed to ensure that the absolute pressure of the water at all the points in the system remains safely above the water's vapor pressure at all times. This prevents problems such as cavitation in circulators and valves or "steam flash" in the piping. The latter is a situation in which the water pressure drops below the vapor pressure, allowing the water to instantly change to vapor (e.g., steam). This can cause loud banging noises in the piping and wide pressure fluctuations in the system. [4] In hydronic systems flashing is the prevalent cause of water hammer. It occurs whenever the actual pressure at any point in the system drops below the vapor pressure and steam bubbles form. This can happen throughout the system when there is a sudden drop in the pressure or when the circulating pumps, which provide a certain amount of overpressure, suddenly stop in an inadequately pressurized system. Additionally, water hammer can be localized at high points of the system, in the vena contracta of throttling devices, or in the eye of the circulating pump impellers, where the lowest system pressure is combined with acceleration of the entering water. [5] The normal operation of the heating system is up to 90 °C ( fig. 1) . By controlling the temperature, the pressure is also controlled in the closed system. If the system does not have proper temperature control, the elements that protect it from overpressure are put on the test. The problem is that these elements are not designed for temperatures above 110 °C and boiling. If the temperature is below 100 °C, there is no explosion in case of vessel failure.
Our answer to the problem was to design and build an experimental facility that would shed light on the phenomena in the closed system above 110 °C and during boiling, in a closed vessel protected by the safety valve. Our analysis does not include the expansion vessel, since the focus of our study was the time when its capacity is used up and the safety valve takes over the control. Our experiment physically models the case when there is no circulation in the heating system. This is the worst case scenario. With circulation, one part of the heat would be removed by the heat receivers.
The motivation for writing this paper was a potential danger for many households in Serbia. The risk of water exploding is somehow foreign to common reasoning. The steam explosion problem was brought to our attention during a court case in which we were asked to provide expertise on the topic. Although the standards are clear, they are not accompanied by explanations. Furthermore, this subject has not been sufficiently studied in the literature.
Problem steam explosion
There are two types of explosions that can occur in a boiler -flue gas side and water side explosions. This paper is focused on the latter type. In order to ensure the safety of systems, the standard requires that closed heating systems have a safety temperature limiter. water mains. When the water temperature reaches 100 °C, cold water is admitted through the heat exchanger; it removes excess heat from the system and therefore stops overheating.
Unfortunately, this recommendation is often ignored. Standards are obligatory only if they are included in the regulations. Residential boilers are not subject to any inspection or regulation. Thus, it is up to manufacturers and installers to do what they think is best, or to users to demand specific solutions. Given the low frequency of explosion occurrence and, in some cases, the unfamiliarity with the standards, manufacturers and installers choose the easier solution, i.e. the closed system without a safety heat exchanger. The pictures below ( fig. 3 ) show a boiler that suffered a steam explosion. There are visible deformations of the top metal sheet, and the side sheet is completely blown away. The boiler is a three-pass solid fuel boiler. Reinforcements in the form of short cylinders can be seen on its side. We cannot disclose further information regarding the explosion, since it is the subject of an ongoing court case.
The energy that is released upon vessel fracture is calculated as the difference between the internal energy before and after the explosion. The acceptable estimate is the assumption that the process is isentropic. [6] The most important factor is the temperature of the water. The tables below show the calculations for the released energy for different cases. Tabs. 1 and 2 represent a case in which the water temperature is above 100 °C and the pressure is varied. Tab. 1 shows the results in terms of kJ/kg of the released energy, and tab. 2 in terms of the vapor share in the expanded state 2. Tab. 3, however, depicts a case where the temperature of the water is below 100 °C, with a pressure range much wider than in the first case. As the released energy in the second case is much smaller, the results had to be multiplied by 1000. Table 3 . Energy released after vessel rupture when water is subcooled The data clearly show that the temperature must be controlled. Pressure increase in itself is a main factor that causes a vessel to rupture, but the temperature is the only factor that causes pressure increase. Therefore, control over the temperature is also control over the pressure.
The previous statements and conclusions are not quite straightforward, i.e. they are not intuitive. For this reason, experiments have been performed to demonstrate the phenomena. Watts USA, a heating and plumbing equipment manufacturer, performed some experiments [7] to show the danger of overheated water in the case of vessel failure. The experiments were done on gas and electric water heaters. During the experiments the pressure and temperature were recorded, and vessel failure was caused using a hydraulic hammer at the predefined time, when the water was overheated. "Overheated" here means heated to a temperature above 100 °C. The consequence is shown in fig.  5 .B.
Then a set of experiments were performed where the temperature was kept below 100 °C and the pressure was increased using a hand pump. The pressure was increased from 20.7 to 27.6 bars, and finally to 34.5 bars. The failure of the vessel was induced by hitting it with a spiked hammer ( fig.4.A) . The consequence is shown in the second picture ( fig.4.B) ; there was no explosion, just a water jet.
Experimental setup
The water vessel consists of a cylindrical part (ϕ406.4 x 8.8 x 500 mm) and two heads (ϕ406.4 x 8.8, according to EN10253-1), with a total volume of 90 l.
The design conditions are as follows: the pressure 16 bar and the temperature 200 °C. All the elements of the vessel were made of steel P235GH. The vessel is dimensioned according to the standard SRPS EN 13445. On the vessel there are connections for: two 9 kW heaters (each heater consists of three 3 kW heating elements), the pressure switch, elements for temperature and pressure measurement, four safety valves, and venting.
The following safety measures were implemented: a line to the safety valve with the pressure set at 6 bar, which was always open ( fig. 6.3) , a pressure switch ( fig. 6.7), a thermostat (fig. 6.6a) , the distance of the measuring desk from the vessel (6 m), a safety screen to prevent direct exposure to hot water, safety helmets, and finally manual control of the heaters at the control cabinet located above the measuring desk.
The temperature was recorded by a PT100 sensor ( fig. 6.8) , and the pressure by MBS3000 ( fig.  6.9) . Both of the signals were converted to a 4-20 mA signal that was lead through ( fig. 6.15) to the data acquisition set positioned at the far end of the laboratory. The pressure and temperature were sampled at 1s. The mass was sampled at 3 s in the first experiment. The measuring uncertainty for temperature measurement by PT100 is 0.5% of Full scale (150 °C), so it is +/-0.75 °C. The measuring uncertainty for pressure measurement by MBS3000 is 0.5% of Full scale (16 bar), so it is +/-0.08 bar.
The experimental facility can work in different working regimes. Therefore, there are globe valves that can determine which safety valve is operational. The experimental procedure is as follows: the venting line is opened, the vessel is filled with water, and then the venting line is closed. In order to purge the air from the lines that lead to the safety valves, the pressure in the system is increased using a hand pump. One by one, the safety valve lines are purged by opening the globe valve in each line.
When the system is purged from the air, the venting line is opened and 3 heaters are started (the total of 9 kW). When the temperature reaches 95 °C, the venting line is closed and the line to the safety valve that is to be tested is opened. In this case, the line to the safety valve is open, with the pressure set at 1.5 bar. Two heaters are turned off. The measurement of the mass can be performed until the point of boiling. This was done in experiment I. The positions of the safety valves are interchangeable. Line 5 ( fig. 6-5 ) is considered for future experiments in terms of the effect of air in the system. The schematic representation is given in fig. 7 .
Results
In experiment I, the mass measurement was done. The results are shown in fig.8 . Since the scales were limited to 4.2 kg, the measuring bucket had to be emptied periodically, at the end of periods A and C. Period B should be discarded as this was the bucket manipulation time. The angle of the slope in period A was greater because three heaters were turned on, compared to one heater in periods C and D. The mass change rate in A was 1.1 gs -1 . In period C the system was closed at the beginning and heated. This caused a rise in the pressure, resulting in the opening of the safety valve. The mass change rate in period C was 0.36 gs -1 .There was no distinction in mass change between these Figure 7 . Schematic representation of experimental facility two phenomena. Additionally, local boiling could not be distinguished in period C. In period D there were some variations in the change of mass, which were the result of local boiling. In period E significant changes were observed, since boiling conditions were reached in a large part of the vessel.
The maximum mass change rate was 45 gs -1 -a 125-fold increase compared to period C.
Figure 8. Mass measuring in experiment I
The goal of this research was to safely measure the pressure change in the boiling phase. This was done in experiment II, and the results are presented in figs. 9 and 10. Fig. 9 also shows the saturation temperature for the measured pressure, and fig. 10 the saturation pressure for the measured temperature. In period A of the experiment the venting line was opened, three 3kW heaters were on, and the heating was done until the temperature of 95° C was reached. In period B the venting line was closed, and one 3kW heater was on. In period C there was a data logging error. The begin point in period C was actually the end point in that period. There was a clear temperature rise trend that could be seen In period E local boiling was approached at the measurement point. Period F was also a data logging error. In period G the boiling volume increased further. Finally, in period H boiling was most intense. The recorded pressure peaks were at 2.2 bar and the lows were at 0.8 bar. The pressure lower than the saturation pressure additionally intensified boiling.
The points of measurement for the pressure and temperature were different. The pressure was measured near the vessel wall ( fig. 6.9 ) and the temperature in the axis of the vessel, 10 cm from the heaters ( fig. 6.8) .
The pressure and temperature changes during period B did not correspond to changes expected when water is heated in a rigid vessel. According to the calculation, the time needed to reach 2.7 bar under the given conditions (volume, heating) was about 10 s (tab. 4). The measured time was 600 s. (tab. 5) The calculated temperature change was 0.1 degree, compared with the measured temperature change, which was above 10 degrees. The question is, under what conditions would the isochoric change calculation be applicable? In cases where it is, a significant rise in the pressure would be achieved with a small amount of energy. The calculated time needed to reach 10 bar was 14.4 s. Temperatures above 100 °C would cause a steam explosion. 
Conclusions
A niche problem has been identified. The heating practice does not conform to the standard. The standard is not included in the regulations, and residential heating systems are not supervised. Manufacturers and installers decide how to install them, and explosions happen.
The core of the problem lies in BLEVE, i.e. the steam explosion. A BLEVE occurs only if water temperature exceeds 100 °C and the vessel fails due to increased pressure.
The safety valve protects the system against pressure increase, but it does not stop overheating. Overheating leads to boiling. Safety valves in common use are designed neither for temperatures over 110 °C nor boiling.
In order for the system to be safe, it must have a safety heat exchanger -the very element that is absent from the practice. The pressure is controlled indirectly, through temperature control.
A physical model of the worst case scenario was therefore designed -a scenario in which there is no flow in the system.
Because of explosion risks, we adopted a cautious approach. Therefore, the first experiments were done with the safety valve set at 1.5 bar and the overheating rate of 3 kW. Our experimental facility had a 3-18 kW power range. The usual boiler heating power in homes is 50 kW. The testing of safety valves with 2.5 and 3 bar set pressure is also planned, where the 3 bar setting is common.
The aim of our research was to test how a normally operating valve behaves in non-operating conditions.
Results show that safety valve DID NOT prevent neither overheating nor boiling. However, that was NOT its job. Its job is maintenance of pressure. By its opening, safety valve should maintain pressure but it could not release all of the extra heat that was in the system. Result was gradual overheating of the system that led to boiling.
In the experiments, the BOILING zone, unacceptable in closed systems, was entered. The recorded pressure peaks were at 2.2 bar and the lows were at 0.8 bar. Based on these results, it was concluded that the safety valve operation (intensive opening and closing) intensified boiling. Therefore, closed systems cannot be considered safe, even with a brand new safety valve and at low overheating rates.
In experiment I, a 125-fold increase in mass flow was recorded, due to boiling phenomena. We believe that the significant difference observed between the calculated and measured time during isochoric heating is the result of air dissolved in water. This will serve as a guideline for future research.
Experiments are also planned with different heating rates and safety valves that have different set pressures, are produced by different manufacturers and belong to different types.
However, we cannot exclude safety valve failure; to make the system absolutely safe, the temperature must be kept below 100 °C. In that case a leak would occur, instead of a steam explosion. In view of these considerations, the above mentioned heating practice is unacceptable.
In our opinion, it is not acceptable practice to allow the closed heating system to enter boiling if it is protected with a safety valve designed for temperatures up to 110 °C. From the engineering point of view, it is easier to prevent temperature rise than to cope with pressure oscillations caused by boiling. That is exactly what the standard demands through the introduction of the safety heat exchanger. By limiting the temperature to below 100 °C, the risk of BLEVE is eliminated.
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